

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 1611

EXDIS/SALT

SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: XGDSI

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR JOHNSON'S STATEMENT OF MARCH 12, 1974
(SALT TWO--405)

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR JOHNSON

MARCH 12, 1974

MR. MINISTER:

IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST SIX MEETINGS I HAVE SET FORTH CERTAIN MAJOR CONCEPTS WHICH, IF ACCEPTED BY BOTH SIDES, WOULD FORM AN OPERATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSLATING THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS INTO AN EQUITABLE AND VERIFIABLE PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH WOULD ENHANCE THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. I HAVE DEVOTED MUCH CARE TO THESE STATEMENTS BECAUSE I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO CONVEY AS COMPLETE AND CORRECT AN UNDERSTANDING AS POSSIBLE OF THESE CONCEPTS. IT IS THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES THAT PROCEEDING FROM THESE MAJOR CONCEPTS WE MUST DEVELOP A COMMON APPROACH BEFORE WE CAN MAKE PROGRESS IN RESOLVING OTHER ISSUES AND IN DRAFTING SPECIFIC PROVISIONS FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

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IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT WHEN WORKING ON A DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX PROBLEM SUCH AS WE ARE CONCERNED WITH HERE THAT ONE SHOULD PROCEED IN AN ORDERLY AND LOGICAL FASHION. AS A FIRST STEP OUR GOVERNMENTS, AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, HAVE CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT ON BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS. THE NEXT STEP IS TO SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE CONCEPTS TO BE USED IN MOVING FROM THESE PRINCIPLES TO THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF AN AGREEMENT. BEYOND THIS LIES THE TASK OF WORKING OUT THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE AGREED CONCEPTS.

II

THE OVERALL U.S. OBJECTIVE CONTINUES TO BE A PERMANENT AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH PROVIDES ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS--ICBMS, SLBMS, AND HEAVY BOMBERS. THIS AGREEMENT MUST HAVE NOT ONLY THE SUBSTANCE OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE BUT ALSO MUST BE DRAWN SO AS TO GIVE THE PERCEPTION OF EQUALITY.

STABILITY IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT CONCEPT AFFECTING THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES. THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT A PERMANENT AGREEMENT SHOULD REDUCE THE UNCERTAINTIES ABOUT THE FUTURE POTENTIAL CAPABILITIES OF THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF EACH SIDE. THIS WOULD PROMOTE STABLE FORCE RELATIONSHIPS UNDER WHICH NEITHER SIDE PERCEIVES THE NECESSITY CONTINUOUSLY TO MATCH MAJOR NEW ARMS PROGRAMS UNDERTAKEN BY THE OTHER SIDE IN ORDER TO AVOID BEING PLACED AT A STRATEGIC DISADVANTAGE. HOWEVER, ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN THE LIMITS AGREED BY THE TWO SIDES WILL NOT OF ITSELF ENSURE STABILITY IN A CRISIS. THE KEY CONDITIONS BEARING ON CRISIS STABILITY AS WE SEE IT ARE THE EVIDENT SURVIVABILITY OF RETALIATORY FORCES AND THEIR EVIDENT ABILITY TO PENETRATE DEFENSES.

AGREEMENTS REACHED MUST, OF COURSE, BE FORMULATED SO AS TO BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIABLE BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS.

III

IN KEEPING WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF ACHIEVING A PERMANENT SECRET

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AGREEMENT LIMITING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WHICH PROVIDES A HIGH DEGREE OF EQUIVALENCE IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF THE TWO SIDES, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED THAT THE TWO SIDES AGREE TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF ICBM AND SLBM LAUNCHERS AND HEAVY BOMBERS TO AN INITIAL AGGREGATE CEILING FOR BOTH SIDES OF 2350--A LEVEL TO WHICH EACH SIDE CAN ADJUST WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN CURRENT DEPLOYMENTS.

SINCE ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN THESE THREE CENTRAL SYSTEMS DEPENDS UPON MORE THAN EQUALITY IN TOTAL NUMBERS, THERE MUST ALSO BE A RELATIONSHIP OF EQUALITY IN THEIR AGGREGATE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL. THIS EQUALITY WOULD BE ACHIEVED BY LIMITING TO SUBSTANTIALLY EQUAL LEVELS THE AGGREGATE DESTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL OF THE CENTRAL SYSTEMS AS REPRESENTED BY THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS, THE THROW-WEIGHT OF SLBMS, AND AN ALLOWANCE FOR THE HEAVY BOMBER FLEETS OF THE TWO SIDES.

SINCE THE DEPLOYMENT OF ICBMS WITH MIRVS HAVING A COUNTERFORCE POTENTIAL POSES THE MOST IMMEDIATE POTENTIAL THREAT TO THE SURVIVABILITY OF STRATEGIC DETERRENT FORCES AND

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TO THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP IN A CRISIS, AND SINCE BOTH SIDES HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF DEPLOYING A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF ICBM MIRVED THROW-WEIGHT IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED THAT PRIORITY CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO THE CONCEPT OF ESTABLISHING LIMITATIONS ON THE AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. THIS ICBM MIRV THROW-WEIGHT LIMITATION WOULD APPLY ONLY TO ICBMS WITH TRUE MIRV CAPABILITY AND NOT TO EXISTING ICBMS WHOSE MULTIPLE REENTRY VEHICLES ARE NOT INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE. WITHIN THIS EQUAL CEILING ON THE THROW-WEIGHT OF ICBMS WITH MIRVS,

EACH SIDE WOULD BE ABLE TO DEPLOY A NUMBER OF ICBMS WITH MIRVS THE TOTAL AGGREGATE THROW-WEIGHT OF WHICH WOULD NOT EXCEED THIS CEILING. IN THIS CONNECTION, PROVIDED THE SOVIET SIDE WILL AGREE TO LIMIT ICBM MIRV THROW-WEIGHT TO EQUAL AGGREGATE LEVELS, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER LIMITATIONS ON SLBM MIRV THROW-WEIGHT AS WELL.

THE UNITED STATES ALSO BELIEVES THAT EQUALITY CAN BE MAINTAINED AND STABILITY CAN BE ENHANCED AT LOWER LEVELS THAN THE INITIALLY AGREED AGGREGATES OF THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. THUS, IN THE CONTEXT OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT, THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS, PHASED OVER
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AN AGREED PERIOD OF TIME, CONSISTENT WITH EQUAL AGGREGATE NUMERICAL LIMITS. UNDER THIS CONCEPT, EACH SIDE WOULD UNDERTAKE THE OBLIGATION TO CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS TO LOWER AGGREGATE LEVELS WHICH WOULD ALSO BE EQUAL FOR THE TWO SIDES. THIS WOULD PERMIT AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO SUCH AGREED LOWER LEVELS IN A MANNER THAT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PRESERVING EQUALITY WHILE ENHANCING THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE.

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE AGREEMENT SHOULD BE FORMULATED IN SUCH A WAY THAT ITS PROVISIONS CAN BE ADEQUATELY VERIFIED BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS. WITH REGARD TO ICBM MIRVED THROW-WEIGHT, EACH SIDE MUST BE ABLE TO ASCERTAIN WITH ACCEPTABLE PRECISION THE THROW-WEIGHT OF EACH OF THE TYPES OF MIRVED ICBMS WHICH CAN BE DEPLOYED BY THE OTHER SIDE. EACH SIDE MUST ALSO BE ABLE TO ASCERTAIN THE NUMBER OF EACH TYPE OF MIRVED ICBM WHICH IS DEPLOYED.

IV

THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE CONCEPTS IT HAS PROPOSED PROVIDE A FIRM BASIS FOR PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATION OF A PERMANENT AGREEMENT ON MORE COMPLETE MEASURES ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THE PROPOSED CONCEPTS ARE FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES AGREED TO AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL BY OUR GOVERNMENTS, AND THEY PROVIDE FOR THE ENHANCEMENT OF EACH SIDE'S NATIONAL SECURITY BY IMPROVING THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES.

WITH REGARD TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL SECURITY, THE UNITED STATES HAS PROPOSED THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES AGREE ON THE CONCEPT OF ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE IN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF THE TWO SIDES--THE SYSTEMS IN WHICH BOTH SIDES HAVE CONCENTRATED THEIR DESTRUCTIVE POWER--BY SETTING EQUAL LIMITS ON THREE MAJOR LEVELS THAT AFFECT THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES: THE NUMBERS OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS; ICBM MIRVED THROW-WEIGHT; AND THE OVERALL DESTRUCTIVE

POTENTIAL OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS. WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT PRIORITY CONSIDERATION SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THE CONCEPT OF ESTABLISHING LIMITATIONS ON ICBM MIRVED THROW-WEIGHT.

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IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING FOR THE REALITY AND APPEARANCE OF STRATEGIC EQUALITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, AN AGREEMENT EMBODYING THESE CONCEPTS WILL STABILIZE THE STRATEGIC BALANCE BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

IN SUM, MR. MINISTER, I HAVE PLACED BEFORE YOU FOR YOUR MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION A FRAMEWORK OF CONCEPTS WHICH I FIRMLY BELIEVE ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE "BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS" SIGNED BY PRESIDENT NIXON AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV IN JUNE, 1973. I HAVE ADVANCED A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK WHICH IS EQUITABLE, AND WHICH COULD CONSTITUTE A COMMON APPROACH TO DEALING WITH THE MATTERS BEFORE US. USING THIS FRAMEWORK, WE CAN PROCEED TO THE NEGOTIATION OF PROVISIONS FOR A PERMANENT AGREEMENT.

JOHNSON

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